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In  a  January  2009  lecture  on  the  financial 
crisis, Federal Reserve (Fed) Chairman Ben S. 
Bernanke  (Bernanke  2009)  advocated  a  new 
Fed policy of credit easing, defined as a com-
bination  of  lending  to  financial  institutions, 
providing liquidity directly to key credit mar-
kets, and buying of long term securities. The 
purchase by the Fed of risky securities, includ-
ing  mortgages  and  bonds  of  the  government- 
sponsored enterprises, may seem controversial. 
Yet Bernanke’s analysis and recommendations 
can be naturally considered in a model relying 
on two mechanisms: 1) fire sales reduce asset 
prices below fundamental values, and 2) finan-
cial institutions prefer speculation to new lend-
ing  when  markets  are  dislocated.  We  offered 
such a model of “unstable banking” in Andrei 
Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny (2009), and here 
review and relate it to Bernanke’s views.
The  model  of  unstable  banking  focuses  on 
what  Gary  B.  Gorton  and  Andrew  Metrick 
(2009) call securitized lending, whereby finan-
cial intermediaries make loans to the real sector 
but then securitize and sell them off, retaining 
a portion as skin in the game. Banks can also 
borrow money short term in the capital markets, 
using  retained  securities  as  collateral.  Banks 
maximize  profits  and  fully  realize  that  senti-
ment regarding the securities they hold on their 
balance sheets may shift in the future, forcing 
them to liquidate their security holdings just as 
their competitors do the same, a phenomenon 
known as fire sales (Shleifer and Vishny 1992). 
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Yet securitization is too profitable for banks to 
hold back, and they expand their balance sheets 
and leverage to the maximum that capital mar-
kets would allow, accepting the risk of fire sales.
When  fire  sales  drive  down  the  prices  of 
assets  serving  as  collateral,  the  equity  of  the 
banks is wiped out as they seek to maintain their 
holdings, so they cannot borrow more in private 
markets.  Because  asset  prices  are  dislocated, 
banks strictly prefer to maintain their positions 
in securities or even add to their holdings to the 
extent they can. Such speculation comes at the 
expense  of  funding  new  projects,  which  can-
not match the returns on distressed securities. 
Because  efficient  projects  are  not  financed  in 
such a crisis, there is room for ex post govern-
ment  intervention,  including  credit  easing,  to 
improve efficiency.
How  does  such  intervention  work?  The 
problem here is not just liquidity shortages of 
financial intermediaries. When banks are liqui-
dating collateral and asset prices are dislocated, 
the injection of new capital into banks, either 
through  equity  or  through  loans,  will  not  by 
itself restart lending because banks will merely 
use the capital to hold onto or acquire more of 
these distressed assets. Speculation crowds out 
lending until asset prices recover. The advan-
tage of government security purchases is pre-
cisely to raise security prices so that financial 
investment  no  longer  dominates  lending,  and 
real investment can restart.
I.  Model
We consider a model with three periods: 1, 2, 
and 3. Real activity consists of identical projects 
that become available in periods 1 and 2 and 
that all pay off in period 3. Each project costs 
$1 to undertake. Whether they are started at t 
= 1 or at t = 2, all these projects pay a known 
amount Z > 1 in t = 3 for certain. The supply 
of projects costing $1 and yielding Z > 1 at both 
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t = 1 and t = 2 is infinite, so their realization 
is  constrained  only  by  finance.  Under  these 
assumptions,  there  is  no  fundamental  risk  to 
investment. For simplicity, we assume that the 
risk-free interest rate is zero.
We assume that all projects must be financed 
by banks, perhaps because screening or moni-
toring by an informed intermediary is essential. 
When a bank finances a $1 project, it collects an 
up-front fee f from the entrepreneur and a cer-
tain repayment of $1 at t = 3. For simplicity, we 
assume that the entrepreneur pays the fee from 
his personal funds. In addition to funding proj-
ects, the bank can buy securities or hold cash. 
Let Nt be the number of new projects the bank 
finances at time t, with t = 1, 2.
The bank can do one of two things with these 
project loans. It can keep them on its books or 
securitize them and sell them in the financial 
market. We model securitization as simply the 
sale in the market of cash flow claims that would 
otherwise be held by banks, so that each individ-
ual loan to a firm can be sold off and represents 
a claim to $1 for certain at time 3. In our model, 
all loans are the same. We assume that when the 
bank sells a loan in the market it must initially 
keep a fraction d of the loan on its own books. 
We can think of d as the bank’s necessary initial 
“skin in the game” when it securitizes loans. If 
N projects are financed and the corresponding 
loans are securitized, the bank must hold dN of 
these securities on its balance sheet at the time 
of the underwriting. The bank does not need to 
hold on to these securities for more than one 
period. With d < 1, the bank may prefer secu-
ritization to holding the full loan on its books 
because securitization allows it to expand both 
its balance sheet and profits.
We denote by Pt with t = 1, 2 the price of the 
securities at time t. Because all projects pay off 
the same $1 to security holders at t = 3, all secu-
rities are identical. Prices of securitized debt can 
deviate from the fundamental value of 1 because 
of investor sentiment, which can reflect either 
beliefs or institutional factors. We assume for 
simplicity that P1 = 1, so the market is rational 
at t = 1 and banks only profit from securitiza-
tion because they can finance more projects and 
collect fees from more entrepreneurs. (Shleifer 
and Vishny (2009) also consider the case of an 
initial bubble at t = 1 with P1 > 1, which makes 
the results stronger.) We focus on the interest-
ing case in which P2 < 1 and furthermore the 
bank actually knows P2. We are thus looking 
for conditions under which the bank expands its 
balance sheet at time 1 through securitization 
even when it knows that good times are about to 
end. We assume that the bank understands the 
model, including the fact that the fundamental 
value of securities is 1 at all times (recall that the 
interest rate is zero). The bank pays out its prof-
its from fees at t = 1 as dividends or employee 
compensation.
The representative bank comes into period 1 
with  E0  in  equity  and  no  deposits.  Let  Et  be 
the bank’s equity at the end of time t = 1, 2, 3. 
The bank can also borrow in financial markets 
short term, using the securities it holds as col-
lateral. We denote by Lt the stock of short-term 
borrowing by the bank from the market at time 
t = 1, 2. Because borrowing is collateralized, 
we assume that the lenders always liquidate col-
lateral quickly enough to be left whole, so these 
loans are safe and bear the interest rate of zero. 
To keep themselves safe, lenders to the bank 
insist that the bank must at all times maintain 
a constant haircut h in the form of securities on 
its debt; that is, Lt = (1 − h) × collateral. When 
P2 < 1, the bank might have to liquidate some of 
its securities to maintain the haircut. We denote 
by s the number of securities the bank sells at 
t = 2.
To  model  the  determination  of  P2,  we  use 
a  variant  of  the  “limits  of  arbitrage”  model 
of Shleifer and Vishny (1997), with the banks 
playing  the  role  of  arbitrageurs.  Specifically, 
we  assume  that  noise  traders  have  unlimited 
aggregate resources but that their demands for 
individual securities are unit elastic. If σ is the 
sentiment shock, then total noise trader demand 
for a given security is given by (1 − σ)/P2. The 
equilibrium price is determined by aggregating 
noise trader and bank demands for each security 
with outstanding supply, equal to 1.
II.  Equilibrium.
Without providing all the details discussed in 
Shleifer and Vishny (2009), we focus on equi-
libria in which in period 1 the bank goes all 
out to finance and securitize projects. It holds 
no cash at t = 1 because securitization is too 
profitable to hold resources back, even though 
P2 < 1 and hoarded cash could earn high returns 
if invested in underpriced securities at t = 2. We 
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as given, and then consider the determination of 
P2.
When the bank commits all of its resources to 
securitization, including raising short term debt, 
the definition of the haircut implies that the ratio 
of equity to assets is equal to the haircut.
(1)       
E1  ______  E1 + L1
    =    
E2  ______  E2 + L2
    = h.
The skin in the game condition with P1 = 1 
amounts to
(2)    E0 + L1  =  Nd.
Solving for the equilibrium number of projects, 
we obtain
(3)    N  =    
E0  ___  dh     .
Here collateral is Nd = E0/h and the loan is 
L1 = (1 − h) × collateral. Equation (3) captures 
the  fundamental  mechanism  of  balance  sheet 
expansion in our model. The bank finances 1/dh 
times its equity in projects. Securitization and 
short  term  borrowing,  through  d  and  h,  have 
multiplicative  effects  on  the  bank’s  balance 
sheet and profits, given by f      N.
Suppose  that  the  t  =  2  demand  shock  for 
securities is severe enough that (1 − P2)/P2 > f, 
so banks would choose to hold on to their secu-
rities, or to buy more, rather than lend to new 
projects. To maintain the haircut, the bank must 
now sell securities. The number of securities s 
that the bank sells is given by
(4)    s  =     
E0  ___  h     c   
1 − P2  ______  P2
         1 − h  _____  h    d 
  =  dN c   
1 − P2  ______  P2
         1 − h  _____  h    d .
The  bank  must  liquidate  the  fraction 
((1 − P2)/P2) × (1 − h)/h of its portfolio. When 
h = 1, there is no liquidation. When P2 = 1 − h, 
the bank must liquidate everything, so assume 
P2 ≥ 1 − h, i.e., the creditors do not liquidate 
the entire portfolio.
In  this  equilibrium,  banks  finance  no  new 
investment at t = 2, even though there is an 
infinite  supply  of  positive  net  present  value 
projects. This equilibrium is inefficient. In the 
second best efficient outcome, banks would sell 
all their holdings of existing securities and use 
the  proceeds  to  finance  new  projects.  But  in 
  equilibrium the banks end up selling as little as 
they possibly can to maintain the haircut, and in 
fact would strictly prefer to buy more at dislo-
cated prices. Speculation strictly dominates new 
lending as long as (1 − P2)/P2 > f.
To compute P2, we continue to assume that 
the banks neither want to nor have to fully liqui-
date their positions at time 2, which amounts to:
(5)    d  +     
f (h − d)
  _______ 
(1 + f  )h
     <  σ  ≤ h.
From  equation  (4),  the  banks’  demand  for  a 
given security, d − s/N, is given by
(6)    d c1 −    1 − h  _____  h        
1 − P2  ______  P2
    d .
The price of each security is determined by 
equating the total demand by the banks, given 
by equation (6), and by the noise traders, given 
by (1 − σ)/P2, with the total supply of each secu-
rity, which is 1. We can solve for P2 to obtain:
(7)    P2  =     
h[1 + d ] − d − σh
    ______________    h − d      .
In a numerical example with h = 0.3, d = 0.2, 
f = 0.06, and σ = 0.25, all the conditions hold 
and P2 = 0.85. The sensitivity of P2 with respect 
to the noise trader shock is given by
(8)       
dP2  ___  dσ     =     −h  _____  h − d     .
When haircuts are small and therefore leverage 
is high, prices are extremely sensitive to shocks. 
Leverage  is  destabilizing  in  this  very  precise 
sense. Levered banks thus create both systemic 
risk  and  economic  volatility.  The  instability 
would  be  even  more  extreme  if  the  haircut  h 
that lenders to the bank demand rises during the 
crisis, perhaps because these lenders are uncer-
tain about bank solvency (Gorton and Metrick 
2009).  By  pursuing  securitization  and  funding 
their security holdings with debt, banks expose 
themselves to the risk of having to liquidate their 
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bring  about  further  declines  in  asset  prices  in 
bad times, as all banks simultaneously sell and 
weaken the banking system as a whole. Since dis-
located security prices at the bottom make hold-
ing onto distressed securities superior to direct 
lending, banks forgo funding real activity, lead-
ing to an economic and not just a financial crisis 
(Victoria Ivashina and David S. Scharfstein pres-
ent evidence of declines in lending in 2008). To 
restore lending, the government must raise P2, so 
speculation is no longer profitable.
III.  Credit Easing
To  analyze  government  security  purchases, 
we assume for simplicity that there is no secu-
ritization  at  t  =  2  but  banks  can  borrow  to 
finance unsecuritized loans, using those loans 
as collateral. The price P2 at which the bank is 
indifferent between lending $1 to a new project 
and investing $1 in securities equates the fees 
from  lending  to  capital  gains  from  investing, 
(1 − P2)/P2 = f.
This  yields  the  equilibrium  P  *
2  needed  to 
restart lending:
(9)    P  *
2  =      1  ____  1 + f     .
In our numerical example, P  *
2 = 0.94, so prices 
must be about 10 percent higher than their level 
without government intervention for lending to 
restart.
The government demand per security, g, for 
the equilibrium price to reach P  *
2 is implicitly 
given by the market clearing condition that the 
bank,  government,  and  noise  trader  demands 
add up to 1:
(10)    d c1 −    
1 − P  *
2  ______ 
P  *
2
         1 − h  _____  h    d
  +     1 − σ  _____ 
P  *
2
     +  g  =  1.
From this we compute:
(11)  g* =  σ − (1 − σ)    f − d a   
h − f (1 − h)
    __________  h    b.
At this level of government demand for secu-
rities, banks are just indifferent between selling 
securities and lending. As government security 
purchases rise above the level given by equation 
(11), banks begin selling securities and lending, 
but  the  price  stays  at P  *
2.  This  continues  until 
government purchases reach g    ** = σ − (1 − σ)f, 
which is the share of securities at which the banks 
are fully out of holding seasoned securities. If the 
government buys more, the price will rise above 
P  *
2. Under the assumption of unit supply, the gov-
ernment’s per security demand g    * is equal to the 
share of securities it holds. This share is increas-
ing in the noise trader shock σ and decreasing 
in the haircut, h. In our numerical example, g    * 
= 3.3 percent and g    ** = 20.5 percent. We can 
also show that the total government spending on 
securities is increasing in the size of the banking 
sector E0, and diminishing in d and h (the param-
eters of balance sheet expansion), as well as in the 
magnitude of sentiment shock.
Government  security  purchases  can  thus 
be effective in this model in restarting project 
finance. In equilibrium, the government avoids a 
fire sale of assets and earns a return on its invest-
ment equivalent to the fees banks collect from 
funding entrepreneurs. We could have alterna-
tively modeled a situation in which the govern-
ment allows P2 to fall, but then intervenes after 
a crisis. In this case, government profits would 
be higher, but an asset fire sale would take place 
and some projects would be lost.
We can ask how security purchases compare to 
alternative policies of bank recapitalization, such 
as  providing  loans  (liquidity)  or  equity  injec-
tions to banks. These policies could also support 
markets for securities, but they are not without 
problems. First, banks may not use the increased 
liquidity to support key credit markets. For exam-
ple, banks may use government loans or equity 
injections to repay their senior creditors (a fea-
ture not present in the model but important in the 
world). Banks may hoard liquidity either to sat-
isfy regulatory capital requirements or because 
they expect an even bigger fire sale of assets in 
the future (Douglas W. Diamond and Raghuram 
G. Rajan 2009). Indeed, in 2009 banks used some 
of the injected liquidity to increase their reserves 
at the Fed. Banks may also buy distressed secu-
rities in markets that are so dislocated that new 
lending is unlikely to revive quickly even if asset 
prices rise sharply (see below). Liquidity injec-
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security   purchases at raising security prices most 
relevant to stimulating new lending.
A  second  problem  with  providing  loans  or 
equity to banks is that such policies target whom 
to rescue. The government may end up provid-
ing resources to institutions that ultimately fail 
and perhaps even encourage some of the desper-
ate lenders to gamble with government funds 
by taking on more risk. Security purchases, in 
contrast, address asset price dislocation directly, 
without picking winners. Importantly, the pro-
vision  of  liquidity  can  complement  security 
purchases once security prices reach 1/(1 + f  ) 
because  at  that  price  level  marginal  liquidity 
goes straight into new lending.
One  of  the  most  interesting  features  of  the 
Fed’s security purchases in 2009 is its focus on 
the relatively less distressed assets, such as the 
debt of government-sponsored enterprises, rather 
than the relatively more toxic ones, such as sub-
prime debt. The Fed also supported markets in 
several relatively safe financial instruments, such 
as commercial paper and money market funds. 
For reasons both in and beyond our model, this 
appears to be a good policy. The model predicts 
that security purchases that do not reduce returns 
on holding securities below those on making new 
loans will not restart lending. With the most toxic 
and severely dislocated assets, the government 
may not be able to raise prices enough to restart 
new  lending  in  the  short  run.  In  contrast,  the 
relatively safer assets the government propped up 
were in the less distressed areas, in which it was 
perhaps easier to get lending restarted. Indeed, 
the recovery of some of the most essential credit 
markets thanks to government security purchases 
can take place in the shadow banking system, 
largely avoiding the troubled banking sector.
The Fed’s purchase of relatively safe securi-
ties also exposes it to less severe information 
problems and a smaller chance of losing money, 
which might be especially important for a pub-
lic agency. At the same time, since the various 
securities are priced in the market relative to 
each other, the Fed’s purchase of less toxic risky 
assets  should  also  help  to  raise  prices  of  the 
more toxic assets. This should strengthen bank 
balance sheets and facilitate the recovery of the 
more dislocated markets in the longer run.
In summary, there are two central messages of 
our analysis of the benefits of security purchases. 
First, compared to more targeted policies aimed 
at the sick institutions, such purchases protect the 
government from wasting money and rewarding 
bad  behavior  while  more  directly  stimulating 
credit markets as a whole. Second, the focus on 
propping  up  dislocated  but  still  relatively  safe 
securities  offers  perhaps  the  best  chance  for 
restarting lending quickly, as well as of introduc-
ing fewer fiscal and political risks.
We can finally comment on ex ante policies. 
Note that, as equation (1) makes clear, the hair-
cut h works exactly like a capital requirement. 
An asset fire sale results as banks seek to raise 
cash to meet their capital requirements. Relaxing 
a  capital  requirement,  which  in  the  model  is 
equivalent to reducing h, would also have a stabi-
lizing influence. More generally, one could con-
sider a policy of raising capital requirements in 
good times and reducing them in bad times. Such 
a policy would force banks to preserve liquidity 
for bad times and enable them to use that spare 
liquidity to make loans when they are needed.
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